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episode of unmediated intuition, but in being a con·ict-free grasp of the whole
structure of reality. While this reading is extremely attractive, I remain unclear as
to whether the author maintains that the form of the Good is identical with the
intelligible structure of reality, or merely whether understanding the former is
necessary and/or su¸cient for understanding the latter. Whatever the answer to
that question, this is a very substantial piece of work.
In contrast, the Aristotle section has more thematic unity, in that each of the four
papers deals with a central topic of the Nicomachean Ethics, speciμcally the doctrine
of the mean (Christoph Rapp), the relation of Aristotle’s ethics to political science
(Gisela Striker), the virtue of epieikeia, including a judicious discussion of the role of
generalisation in Aristotle’s ethics (Christoph Horn), and the beneμts of virtue (Jan
Szaif ). The last-mentioned essay includes excellent discussions of altruism and of the
di¸culty of reconciling Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous person chooses good
actions for their own sake with the argument of 1171b1–26 that political activity is
less valuable than theôria because the former is undertaken only for ends external to
it, and is therefore ‘unleisured’. All these contributions display close knowledge of the
texts and a high degree of analytic acuity. As it happens, all four authors are German,
three currently teaching at German universities; the study of Aristotle’s ethics is
clearly in a very healthy state in Germany.
Professor Frede’s work on Hellenistic philosophy is appropriately honoured by the
two articles on Epicureanism, by David Konstan on the passions and Susanne
Bobzien on moral responsibility. Both are lucid and learned works, which maintain
the high standard of the volume.
The articles are complemented by an honoriμc preface, a useful thematic
introduction, index locorum, general index, general bibliography and bibliography of
Professor Frede’s writings. It is an excellent piece of editing; I noticed no misprints.
(In addition, it has a delightful emblematic picture on the dust-jacket.) It is a sign of
the times that though the honorand, the Editor and μve of the eleven contributors are
German, the entire book, including the editorial matter, is in English, and is published
in the UK. This suggests that the humanities are moving towards the situation which
already obtains in the natural sciences, where work intended for an international
readership is published exclusively in English, other languages being for domestic use
only. That development may be inevitable (and is certainly convenient for native
Anglophones), but the cultural uniformity which it threatens is not altogether to be
welcomed.
Corpus Christi College, Oxford C.C.W. TAYLOR
christopher.taylor@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Konstan has been lecturing and publishing regularly and increasingly on ancient
Greek emotions for at least the last μfteen years. This book is a natural culmination in
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which, with considerable success and panache, he develops that work into a coherent
whole. The book begins with an extensive introduction outlining the major modern
controversies in emotion studies. One of the most important is whether emotions
should be considered universal or culturally speciμc. K. argues that, while in general
there is much overlap between individual emotion terms in ancient Greek and modern
English, because emotions are based on a way of looking at the world, ultimately the
parameters of an emotion must be unique to a culture. He makes an instructive
comparison with colour words: the Greeks would have had the same visible spectrum
as we do, but they described those colours differently; for instance, we might variously
translate glaukos as ‘blue-green’, ‘pale blue’, or ‘gray’. Similarly, Aristotle splits our
anger into two Greek emotions (orgê for response to a slight, to nemesan for response
to an injustice), but collapses our shame and guilt into a single concept. K.’s approach
is fundamentally philological: he insists throughout that, instead of assuming ancient
Greek emotions map easily on to their modern English equivalents, one must examine
carefully the boundaries of the Greek terminology used.
A parallel controversy is the dispute between what K. terms ‘neo-Darwinists’ and
‘cognitivists’ on the nature of emotions. Following the work of Darwin in the late
nineteenth century, ‘neo-Darwinists’ focus on the re·ex responses (e.g. facial
expression, ·ushing) that express an emotion. The ‘cognitivist’ approach dates from
the 1970s, with scholars overturning the post-Cartesian opposition between reason
and emotion, arguing instead that emotions are best understood as judgements based
on cognitive evaluations. K. argues that these schools of thought are not irrecon-
cilable, as an emotion is made up of both stimulus and response, while each school
concentrates on only one. However, he μrmly aligns his own work with the
‘cognitivists’, though arguing with Aristotle that judgements are ‘strongly
conditioned by the social environment’ (p. 22), and that, at least in the archaic and
classical periods, ancient Greek emotions are best understood as ‘responses … to
actions, or situations resulting from actions, that entail consequences for one’s own or
others’ relative social standing’ (p. 40).
This emphasis on the socially reactive aspect of emotions pervades and informs
the remaining eleven chapters, respectively on: anger; satisfaction; shame; envy and
indignation; fear; gratitude; love; hatred; pity; jealousy; and grief. The book is
mainly concerned with the emotions Aristotle gives socio-psychological analyses
for in the Rhetoric (though for expository reasons they are discussed in a different
order). The greater part of each chapter contains a detailed, and consistent,
analysis of the phenomena Aristotle deals with, and the vocabulary used to
describe them. K. is highly sensitive to nuances of different words used to express
subtly different concepts. The chapters typically go on to compare K.’s interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s emotions with their depiction in a wide range of Greek
literature, especially in Homer, tragedy, oratory and Hellenistic philosophy. There
is insu¸cient space in this review to discuss all eleven chapters, but a subset will be
representative.
K. argues against the usual translation of ‘kindness’ for the emotion discussed in
Rhet. 2.7, on the grounds that for Aristotle an emotion can only be a reaction to a
cognitive stimulus, not a general disposition. He demonstrates persuasively that the
emotion treated is not kharis (best translated ‘favour’ or ‘benefaction’, rather than
‘kindness’), but kharin ekhein, or ‘gratitude’ for a favour rendered; kharizesthai and
akharistein at the end of Aristotle’s chapter are respectively translated ‘doing favours’
and ‘acting ungratefully’.
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K.’s proposition that ‘satisfaction’ is a more appropriate translation of praotês than
the traditional ‘calming down’, is less persuasive. He argues that Aristotle’s system
leaves scope for ‘a pleasurable response to a gesture that enhances one’s status or
self-esteem’ (p. 89), as an opposite to anger being a painful response to a slight;
whether or not there is such scope, it is not clear that praotês is that emotion: ‘satis-
faction’ works well for some parts of Rhet. 2.3, but ‘calming down’ better for others.
In any event (as K. notes elsewhere), the opposite of a pain is not consistently a
pleasure in Aristotle: pity is a response to someone’s undeserved bad fortune, and
indignation a response to their undeserved good fortune; these emotions are
described as opposites, but both are painful. Aristotle’s ‘system’ does not seem quite
as neat as K. might like.
K. devotes one chapter to Aristotle’s two emotions to nemesan (‘indignation’) and
phthonos (‘envy’). He argues that the interpretation of the archaic nemesis as an
indignant response to a rupture of social norms, fell in the classical period within the
(wider) purview of phthonos. As K. demonstrates, nemesis is barely used in the
classical period outside Aristotle, who resurrected it to describe justiμed indignation.
However, the usual oratorical word for this is orgê; only occasionally is it called
phthonos. This is a rare instance in which Aristotle shows himself signiμcantly out of
sympathy with contemporary literary usage.
K.’s case that the modern English and ancient Greek repertoires of emotions are
not wholly in sync, is most effectively demonstrated by his chapter on jealousy, an
emotion Aristotle does not treat. It becomes clear that this is because the emotion, as
we understand it, did not even exist in ancient Greece. Greeks could express an
emotion representing a desire for exclusivity within a sexual relationship, an emotion
that could be termed zêlotypia from the fourth century b.c.e.; but K. painstakingly
demonstrates that the Greeks (whether Hera, Medea or Eratosthenes’ murderer) did
not feel pain at the alienation of someone’s affection. K. speculates that such an
emotion was not possible until women had equal status to men, and equal right to a
chronic emotional attachment; accordingly an emotion similar to our jealousy does
not appear in ancient literature until the odes of Horace. This is K.’s strongest, and
most thought-provoking, challenge to our tendency to think of our own emotional
repertoire as natural and universal.
This book is a pleasure to read. K. is never less than informed and incisive, and
never afraid to be iconoclastic. He is clearly highly familiar with both the
wide variety of ancient and medieval commentary on the emotions, and the
modern, multi-disciplinary explosion of scholarship in the μeld, especially in the
last 30 years, and this emerges most clearly in the copious endnotes (referring to
scholarship in at least seven languages), and extensive bibliography. This reviewer
missed a chapter on zêlos (a curious omission), and wondered whether chapters on
jealousy and grief were included mainly because the author had something
valuable to say (it is unclear why these should be singled out from all the emotions
Aristotle does not treat). But these are minor quibbles about a major intellectual
achievement. This book is a ‘must read’ for any classicist (and indeed
non-classicist) interested in the emotions, and no serious scholar in the μeld will
want to be without a copy.
University College London EDWARD SANDERS
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